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France lived through a long period of nationalization until the early 1980s, when 
nearly all the largest industrials firms as well as all the banks and public services 
were state-owned. Since then, a series of privatization moves have caused the state 
sector to shrink. Public services present a complex situation. For example, after its 
IPO, the national telecommunications operator France Telecom was simultaneously 
subjected to the deregulation of the telecom market in the world  and to a new type of 
governance. EDF, the national electricity producer is next in line and should 
experience the same problems and opportunities. 
JEL classification: L33, L50, L97. 
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1. Introduction: Nationalization and privatization in France, an 
historical perspective  
The approach used in this paper is two-fold. First a general introduction to the specific features of 
French privatization policies is set out, then their impact is studied using the example of France 
Telecom, the incumbent telecommunications operator, with additional information about other 
significant firms. As France does not provide any dramatic examples of privatization policies, the 
interesting part of the story lies in the change of perspective that has led this country to stop being a 
champion of nationalization and to manage partially privatized firms within the framework of 
liberalization in Europe. 
 
1.1.  Nationalization Policies 
Indeed, French privatization cannot be understood without a long historical perspective: before 
privatization, France has lived through a long period of nationalization and has built at some time a 
“doctrine” about the coexistence of the private and the public sector. Public services were 
traditionally provided by state-owned monopolies. 
One can list three major periods when private companies have been nationalized in France: 
-  at the end of the XIX° century for some railways and the telephone. The PTT were created in 
1889 by the merger of the state administration of Posts and Telegraphs and the privately-held 
Société Générale des Téléphones on the other side. The resulting PTT administration has lived 
until 1991. 
-  Before and after World War II, for the railways, the central bank, the energy producers, the 
major banks and the car manufacturer Renault; some of them are still state-owned in 2003. 
-  In 1981-1982, the socialist government (F. Mitterrand being President of the Republic) 
nationalized all the largest industrial companies and banks remaining in private hands. Most of 
them have returned to the private sector before 2000. 
 
The rationale behind these various moves can be summarized as follows: 
1 - Some private companies were in poor financial health, and/or provided substandard services 
(railways, telephones, steel-makers, computer manufacturers, etc.). 
2 - Some firms were thought to be too powerful or strategic to remain private companies: their 
resources and policies had a large impact on economic policies as a whole (banks, energy, 
transportation, defense). So in order to have a free hand for its economic and social policy, the 
government concluded it had to own all the largest companies in the country. This was especially 
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crucial after World War II when the country infrastructure had to be rebuilt as fast as possible, but it 
also inspired the nationalization policy of 1982. However, the debate between proponents and 
opponents of nationalization in 1982 looked like “theology” to the respected political commentator 
André Fontaine (Fontaine, 1981). Fontaine predicted limited impact on industrial firms, but more 
on banks. Indeed, as Jacques Attali (Attali, 1994), special assistant to President Mitterrand from 
1981 to 1991, put it bluntly much later:  
“Had we not nationalized banks, banks would have been extremely hostile to all reforms. 
Maybe the Left has not transformed them into allies […] but we have at least weakened and 
neutralized a potential “enemy”.  
We can add that the government wanted to use these firms as examples of well run companies with 
advanced  social policies. 
3 - Finally, a special case with Renault: because Louis Renault, then head of the company, had 
collaborated with the occupying German forces during World War II, his property was seized.  
 
Starting with Colbert, the “mercantilist” finance minister of Louis XIV in the 17
th century, 
French governments have slowly built a doctrine of a “mixed economy” blending powerful public 
services, large state-owned companies in heavy industries, energy, transportation and finance and 
small private companies. Nationalization was just one part in a global policy including five-year 
economic plans, price controls, “export management”, technology management etc. (Cohen, 1992) 
The peak of this policy can be found during the period when the Socialist Party and their allies ruled 
France from 1981 to 1986. At that time, the total public sector (central and local government plus 
state-controlled companies) represented 21 % of production, 23 % of wages earners, 28 % of GDP, 
30 % of exports and 49 % of gross capital formation (Mamou 1996). 
 
Table 1 about here 
Table 2 about here 
  
1.2.  The case for privatization – major factors 
However, it became clear over time that this situation could not go on forever  for four major 
reasons: 
1 – Besides the theoretical critics of state ownership of firms, basically resting on the theory of 
incentives, the French state behaved as a weak and erratic “shareholder”, hesitating between the 
maximization of short-term financial or political benefits and a “laissez-faire” approach supposed to 
let the state firms develop as they wished, in spite of the bureaucratic control of their activities. 
Several severe audits of state management of  public firms can be found, most recently a report of 
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the National Assembly (Diefenbacher 2003). In particular, the national telecom operator has long 
suffered from these vagaries (Bonnetblanc 1985; Bertolus 2003). Adverse effects of poor state 
control can be felt by the firms themselves, by the Treasury as well by other French investors
1. One 
radical way to solve the problem was privatization. Another was to better manage state investments: 
the Ministry of Finance created in 2003 a state agency, Agence des Participations de l’Etat, to bring 
more consistency and vision to the management of state holdings (Barbier de la Serre 2003; Minefi, 
2003). In 1999, the total value of shares detained by the state amounted to €400 bn
2. The French 
state is a major player on the Paris Bourse (now called Euronext)
3.  
2 - The co-existence of state-run and private companies (as in the car industry since 1945 or in the 
telecom industry more recently) is awkward, and could prevent nationalized companies from 
expanding freely at home and abroad; any expansion by a state-owned firm leads the public sector 
to grow, even without any new nationalization measure.  
3 - Even though they can boast an outstanding technical record (see section 3 for examples), state 
monopolies suffered from time to time from traditional problems like high prices, low regard for 
customers, bureaucratic attitude (see Giraud 1987 for the case of telecommunications). They also 
engaged into uncontrolled and costly expansion policies because of the weakness of government 
control.  
4 - A major liberalization and privatization drive started internationally in the 80s and France 
followed the trend. Media provide a good example: even the promoter of the public sector and 
major architect of nationalization, President Mitterrand, starting in 1982, opened the broadcasting 
sector to private operators. This paved the way later for the privatization of the largest public TV 
channel, TF1. Even though European competition policy does not demand privatization, it imposes 
severe restrictions on government intervention in the economy (like state aids); at the same time, 
deregulation policies (telecom, electricity, railways etc.) allow new entrants – private companies, 
that nearly automatically complain about the former state-owned monopoly and lead to difficulties 
with the European Commission. 
 
1.3.  Privatization timeline 
Privatization in France took place in several phases depending on the following factors: 
1 - The outcome of legislative elections is the most crucial; in France, the Prime Minister represents 
the party winning the legislative elections (National Assembly, dominant part of the Parliament) 
and sets the political agenda
4. The center-right parties (led by the RPR
5 – since 2002 called UMP
6) 
have initiated the privatization drive in 1986, but are cautious as regards the privatization of public 
services. The  Socialist party (the major component of the political “Left” in France) after the 
nationalization episode of 1982, has emitted diverging opinions about the management of state 
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firms and in 2003, this question is still a matter of internal debate in the party. As stated frankly by 
Henri Emmannuelli, one of the pillars of the Socialist Party:  
“The opinion varies depending on whether we are in the majority or in the opposition.” (Le 
Cœur and Macke 2003). 
2 - Prices on the Paris Bourse (see Graph 1 for the CAC 40 index over the period 1986-2003) are 
important as to the timing of privatization, but have a very limited impact on privatization 
decisions. 
3 - European deregulation policies (so far particularly in the Telecom sector, but energy is the next 
on the list).  
4 - Sector evolution like technical innovation, alliances, globalization. The management of public 
entities may ask the Government to privatize their firm in order to pursue their development plans. 
For example, Michel Blanc, then CEO of Air France, resigned in 1997 when the then prime 
Minister L. Jospin refused to privatize the national airline. 
The size of the state budget deficit also provides a permanent incentive to privatize state 
firms as France has constantly experienced budget deficits since 1981. Proceeds from the sales of 
assets are welcome to finance various types of expenses that would be impossible to fund given the 
budget situation. 
 
Graph 1 about here 
 
After five years of socialist government, the center-right parties were in power again in 
1986-1988 and started dismantling the then enormous state sector. They benefited from favorable 
conditions on the Paris Bourse, at least until the minor 1997 stock crash. The Socialists came back 
to power in 1988 with a fragile majority in the National Assembly. They enforced a policy that was 
then was dubbed “neither-neither” (ni-ni in French): no privatization made by the previous 
government was overturned, but no further privatization was allowed. Limited operations happened 
nevertheless. The Socialists lost the general elections in 1993, and more privatization was decided 
on by the Prime Minister Edouard Balladur. In 1995, Jacques Chirac won the presidential elections 
as well as the legislative elections and additional privatization took place. In 1997, the president 
called for legislative elections and lost them to the Socialists. After some hesitation, the new Prime 
Minister Jospin went on privatizing state firms on a large scale. Finally, in 2002, Jacques Chirac 
won the presidential elections and the Right won the legislative elections.  
 
Table 3 about here 
Table 4 about here 
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Since 2002, the center-right government of Jean-Pierre Raffarin has made clear he favors 
privatizing state-owned companies. In his General Policy Address to the National Assembly in July 
2002, the Prime Minister said:  
“ We have a pragmatic approach to the state's role in the economy. As such, we will 
analyse capital release and privatisation projects case-by-case, taking particular account of 
companies' interests and the potential for alliances and development. This policy can only 
be envisaged over the full length of the term. In general, the state's aim is to withdraw from 
the competitive sector unless specific strategic interests make this undesirable.” (Raffarin 
2002).  
One can add that the unsatisfactory government budget situation is a strong incentive to sell and 
raise funds. However, this government has been very pragmatic in his approach: 
-  selling when favorable conditions appeared (for example, Crédit Lyonnais, sold over a week-
end to Crédit Agricole in 2003 after some hectic bidding). 
-  taking into account the long-term interests of the companies (as in the Air France – KLM 
merger decided at the end of 2003 – that has lowered the share held by the state below 50 %). 
-  and even trying to “re-nationalize” companies in deep trouble: such a rumor circulated 
regarding France Telecom in 2002 when the operator was close to financial breakdown. 
Considerable financial aid to France Telecom was given through other means. A bolder move 
was the attempt to rescue Alstom, the troubled electric and transportation equipment 
manufacturer in the summer of 2003. The French government wanted to buy 300 M€ shares in 
Alstom. But this plan was not approved by the European authorities and the government had to 
devise a different plan for Alstom. 
 
1.4.  Privatization income 
The large number of firms sold and their size make privatization a profitable operation for the 
government. An evaluation commission (Commission des Participations et des Transferts) created 
in 1986 estimates the value of the companies on sale. The Minister of Economy decides on the 
actual sale price (higher than the price floor price set by the Commission) and the sale method: sale 
on the stock market, sale to a single investor or a group of investors by mutual agreement or 
through an auction. 
The funds obtained in the sale are housed in a special account (Compte d’affectation des 
produits de cession). This account is also used when the state-owned companies need fresh capital 
and loans, in particular before they are sold. Graph 2 shows the annual balance of this fund.   
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According to (Minefi, 2003), the gross privatization income from 1986 to July 2003 amounted to 
65.8 bn €, used in the following way: 
-  €9 bn to reduce the public debt (mostly between 1986 and 1988); 
-  €1.6 bn allocated to a special pensions fund set up to ease the impact of demographic transition 
on the French pensions system; 
-  €50.5 bn allocated to the firms as equity injection; 
-  4.7 bn € for the regular state budget (in the early nineties).  
  
Graph 2 about here 
 
Depending on the methodology used, other figures can be presented. As an example, France 
Telecom has generated 12.3 bn € of gross privatization income between 1986 and 2003 (excluding 
dividends, interests on loans etc.). When the state has allowed the firm to benefit from an increase 
in capital of 9 bn € in 2003, this sum has been provided by a state-owned financial holding called 
ERAP. ERAP has borrowed money to provide the amount required. This is not, from a formal point 
of view, an outlay by the state and therefore is not deducted from the gross income given above. 
Using this methodology, the Ministry of Finance finds that only 6 major firms show a negative 
balance (gross income minus outlays) over the period 1986-2003: Air France, Bull, Crédit 
Lyonnais, Société marseillaise de crédit, Thomson and Usinor. All these companies have lived 
through very difficult times.  
 
As can be expected, different figures have be computed by other sources. Table 5 shows 
independent estimates from Mauduit (2002). 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Whatever the computations made, from Graph 1  and 2 and Table 4 we can conclude that 
until 1997, privatization policies were conducted by the Right only, while the left abstained. After 
1997, the Left has adopted a more pragmatic approach and privatized major companies. We will see 
in below how the IPO of France Telecom played a major role in this policy change.  
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2. Impact of privatization 
  
2.1.  Changes of ownership 
2.1.1.  Principles and procedures 
Two very different cases can be distinguished regarding changes of ownership. Some companies 
were swiftly and totally privatized (the smaller ones or the industrial firms nationalized in 1982), 
but a large number of state-controlled companies went through a very long and sometimes painful 
privatization process: after a partial IPO, the state gradually sold additional chunks of shares until 
its participation became nil or reduced to a “golden share” (action spécifique). In a few extreme 
cases, this last step has not been possible yet either because of legal problems (as we will see in the 
case of France Telecom) or because of the poor financial health of the company (as for Bull, the 
troubled computer firm). 
 
The legal privatization framework includes a mention in the French Constitution: 
“The law determines the rules of nationalization of firms and the transfers of ownership of 
firms from the public sector to the private sector” (article 34). (Legifrance 1958) 
Therefore three acts have been passed, covering the standard cases. One of them, voted in 1986, 
determines the procedures (JO 1986b) while the two others, voted in 1986 and 1993, list the 
operations to be conducted (JO 1986a; JO 1993). For the largest companies, a special privatization 
act is needed to prepare the operation. A government  decree is enough for smaller firms. 
 
Moreover, all large public firms have hundreds, sometimes thousands of subsidiaries. Sales, 
joint-ventures, creations etc. are part of the normal development of businesses: therefore, a special 
system has been set up to allow normal “respiration” of the public sector. Most subsidiaries of state-
owned firms as well as local public services (sociétés d’économie mixtes locales) since 1993, can be 
sold under two simple declarative procedures (Minefi 2003). From July 1993 to July 2003, 324 
sales involving 159,622 employees have been performed under the “respiration system”; from July 
2002 to July 2003, 18 sales were performed, involving 2555 employees. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
2.1.2.  France Telecom 
If we take the case of France Telecom, the full privatization process required three steps.  The first 
one was the transformation of the PTT administration into two para-statal entities – this has been 
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done by an act voted on July 2, 1990 (JO 1990a) creating La Poste and France Telecom. A large 
scale public debate was organized beforehand by the Ministry of PTT to prepare the move (Prévot, 
1989). The unions were satisfied by the guarantees offered that the personnel would remain mostly 
public servants and that no further change was prepared, except for another act voted on December 
29, 1990 (JO 1990b) This last act introduced the changes needed by the new European regulatory 
regime following the 1987 Green Book on telecommunications (Commission 1987). However more 
changes were soon needed to cope with the decision, taken in 1993 at the European level, to have 
full competition in 1998 in the telecommunication sector. The French government, pushed by the 
top management of France Telecom, decided to make an initial public offering (IPO) of the 
company in 1995. The change of statute was mainly justified by the international ambitions of 
France Telecom, after several promising deals abroad (Argentina, Mexico, and above all a strategic 
alliance with Deutsche Telekom and Sprint). However, the IPO was delayed by protests of the trade 
unions and the many other social problems encountered by the government at that time. In 1995, 
after the elections, a new CEO was named (Michel Bon) with a clear mandate to manage the change 
of statute and the IPO. To prepare the introduction of full competition in 1998, a second 





An EPIC (Etablissement public à caractère industriel ou commercial) is a state entity with mixed 
features. On one side, it belongs to the state system: its mission is defined by law and cannot be 
easily extended (this is called the “specialty principle”); it cannot default financially as it benefits 
from state backing; it does not always pay taxes like a normal company; it has a Board nominated 
by the state and all its main decisions have to be approved a posteriori. On the other side, it 
conducts quasi-normal commercial operations, can enter partnerships and own subsidiaries.  
Variations exist in the actual statute of the many EPICs found in France. From 1991 to 1996 France 
Telecom was a exploitant public (state-owned operator), a special kind of EPIC. 
(Minefi 1991) 
 
As a companion to this 26 July 1996 telecom regulation act (JO 1996a) another act was also 
adopted in 1996 transforming the para-statal entity France Telecom into a quasi-standard private 
company (JO 1996b). Moreover, in 1997, France Telecom paid bn5.7 € to the state as a lump sum 
to be used to pay the extra costs of the pensions of its retiring civil servants: the government was 
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happy to receive funds lowering the budget deficit while France Telecom was happy to get rid of a 
sizable pension debt looming in the future. 
 
These changes opened the way for the second step in the privatization process, the Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) of France Telecom in 1997. The IPO was planned for the Spring of 1997 and 
a lengthy internal communication process took place to overcome the strong opposition from the 
unions despite the promise of the government that the state would keep control of the firm. But the 
center-right Juppé government lost the legislative elections at that time and was replaced by the 
Jospin government (socialist). The new Prime Minister asked for a “social audit” of the whole 
process (the socialists being traditionally against privatization) but finally gave the green light to the 
IPO, understanding that the government was unable to finance the development of France Telecom 
in the new international competitive context (Bertolus 2003 35-70). 
 
The IPO took place in the Fall of 1997 and netted €29 bn. The state kept 75 % of the capital; 
4 million individual shareholders asked 3 times the number of available shares and finally got 10.55 
% of the capital. Financial institutions obtained 11.95 % (they had asked 20 times the number of 
available shares) and 70 % of the personnel of France Telecom bought 2.5 %. A second public 
offering took place in 1998 and netted €9 bn. 
As shown in Table 7, the percentage of France Telecom owned by the state has not decreased 
regularly. In 2002-2003, the government had to rescue France Telecom, then in dire financial straits 
due to its enormous debt (see Section 4 for details). On this occasion, part of the state participation 
was allocated to a state-owned financial holding company, originally devoted to the oil sector, 
ERAP. In October 2003, the state held 28.69 % of the capital of France Telecom.  
The last step will happen when the state sells its last share of France Telecom. Back in 1997, more 
than 80 % of France Telecom personnel were civil servants and a decision by Conseil d’Etat, the 
Government counsel and higher administrative court, had made it clear that civil servants could 
work in a private company only if (1) the government still held the majority of shares directly or 
indirectly and (2) the company was in charge of a public service (Conseil d’Etat 1993). France 
Telecom met the two conditions. However, in 2003 two changes appeared. On one side, the new 
European telecom regulatory package was enforced demanding that Universal Service be tendered. 
Therefore, France Telecom could, in theory, lose Universal Service. On top of that, the Raffarin 
government (center-right) opened the way to a sale of more France Telecom shares, a move 
designed to fill the state coffers as well a to free France Telecom from government control (useful 
for the international expansion of the firm). A law was adopted by Parliament at the end of 2003 
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(Mer 2003, JO 2004). In a derogatory way, it allows the 104,000 civil servants still working at 
France Telecom at that time to remain in the company until they retire. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
2.2.  Who owns the privatized firms ? 
One major concern of the French government was to keep control of the companies while selling 
their capital, or at least to prevent the privatized companies from falling into foreign hands. During 
the first privatization phase, in 1986-1988, the government tried to set-up stable groups of investors 
(in French Noyaux durs for “hard core”). This decision generated a long controversy about the 
choice of these friendly and stable investors; it was modified in 1989 (JO 1989). There was a 
limited number of potential investors in France, this led to a fairly high level of “consanguinity” 
between all the groups with the largest banks playing a major role in the process. As shown in Table 
6, the percentage of foreign ownership has nevertheless grown to very high levels for some 
companies. In an extreme case, in 2003, the Canadian firm Alcan has launched an offer for 
Pechiney – so the later will not longer be under French management. One can safely conclude that 
the globalization of business has dealt a fatal blow to any dreams of national independence that 
might have inspired French governments in the past.  
 
Table 8 about here 
 
Another impact was the creation of a large class of small shareholders, tempted by the initial 
public offering of blue-chip stocks. As shown in Table 9, the largest groups of private shareholders 
were to be found in banks, large industrial firms and France Telecom. The France Telecom IPO 
generated a tremendous interest in the general public, who was severely rocked by the incredible 
rise and precipitous decline of the price of the share in the later years. Details about the financial 
performance of privatized companies will be found in Section 4. However, private investors have 
kept a hearty appetite for shares of privatized companies as proven by the various recent IPOs. 
(Observatoire, 2003). The staff of privatized companies has also massively bought the shares 
reserved for them by law (at very sweet prices). But as France Telecom staff members soon 
understood, it could be a risky investment: they have seen the value of their shares divided by 11 
between 2000 and 2002. (de Tricornot and Picquet, 2002).  
 
Table 9 about here 
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2.3.  Changes in regulation 
2.3.1.  Setting up independent regulators 
France does not have a long tradition of independent regulators: direct intervention by the 
administration was deemed enough to regulate the existing strong monopolies. For example, the 
central banker, Banque de France, created in 1800 as a private entity, had been nationalized in 1936 
but obtained its full independence in 1993 only. With the arrival of new entrants following 
deregulation in most sectors, new bodies were set up. A good example is provided by the 
broadcasting regulator CSA which has been preceded by two short-lived and controversial bodies. 
Most of these regulators are independent regulatory authorities (Conseil d’Etat 2002). But there is at 
least one special case: in the railway industry, the network has been transferred to Réseau Ferré de 
France. This is a state company (“EPIC”). It manages the network and regulates rail transport. It 
receives tolls from the state company, SNCF and any other users. RFF decides on network 
expansion, subcontracts construction work and pays SNCF for network maintenance. 
 
Table 10 about here 
 
2.3.2.  Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications and Ministry of Economy 
In the focus made on the telecommunications sector,  ART provides a good example of the 
problems encountered. It was set up in 1987, one year only before the sector was fully deregulated, 
so it has a limited experience;  it shares with CSA the regulation of converging services; moreover 
radio spectrum allocation is decided in a two-stage process supervised by the inter-ministry Agence 
Nationale des Fréquences (ANFR); finally, it faces a formidable incumbent, France Telecom, 
formally under the control of the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry. As we will show 
later, France Telecom has embarked on an ambitious development plan following its IPO. This plan 
has failed and a controversy has risen in 2002 about government control of the company. 
Obviously, France Telecom has been able to decide on its own in many instances, but one should 
stress that government control is weak for a structural reason: as the promoter of competition 
policy, it cannot closely monitor France Telecom – or it would be accused of ruining competition. 
(Diefenbacher 2003).  
 
 
2.4.  Changes in competition 
Privatization does not appear to be a key ingredient in changes in the competitive situation in 
France. Deregulation is the key factor, and privatization of any state-owned firm can only help as its 
clears the way for a “normal” competitive situation. It is indeed a very awkward situation when the 
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state is at the same time promoting competition and the owner of the largest market player. 
Furthermore, the situation is quite different in the network industries and in the other sectors. In the 
latter case, competition is the normal way to run markets and barriers to entry tend to be lower. In 
network industries, barriers to entry can be extremely high for economic reasons – the so-called 
natural monopoly problem, or the related “essential facilities” problem. There could be as well legal 
reasons such as licensing but the current deregulation process taking place in Europe is slowly 
eliminating this last obstacle. Therefore, the privatization of a state monopoly will give various 
results depending on these elements as shown by the contrasted situation of airlines and 
telecommunications. Until the arrival of low-cost companies in the XXIth century, Air France has 
kept a strong grip on the French market and all moves to create a viable competitor to the flag 
carrier have failed, as testified by the attempts of British Airways, Swissair (with Air Lib), as well 
as several independent companies.  
 
2.4.1.  France Telecom 
On the other hand, France Telecom has steadily lost market share to its competitors: at the end of 
2002, it held less than 50 % of the mobile market and 64 % of the long distance market. It keeps 81 
% of the local telecommunications market, but the unbundling of the local loop is progressing fast 
as shown in Table 11.  
 
Table 11 about here 
 
One can add that an indirect impact on competition comes from privatization. When a firm 
leaves the state sector, it undergoes a drastic change in its corporate culture, usually becomes more 
aggressive on the market and more flexible in its management. These points will be further 
expanded in a later paragraph on the performance of privatized companies. 
 
 
3. Sector issues 
Several reasons explain why some sectors have been privatized faster than others: 
1 - The existence of competition makes public management very complicated. As explained above, 
in the case of the car manufacturer Renault, the government was at the same time the owner of the 
largest car company and was regulating the car industry: any move by the government regarding 
technical standards, competition policy etc. had conflicting impacts on its two missions; 
2 - Some companies had been state-owned in the eighties for a short period only, after 1982. 
Privatizing them was easier than the public services under public management for decades; 
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3 - European deregulation did accelerate privatization schemes: in telecoms and air transport, 
deregulation has taken place and national companies have been at least partially privatized; 
deregulation was under way in rail transport, energy and postal services at the end of 2003. No 
concrete privatization moves have happened early 2004, but they are being contemplated in the 
electricity and gas sectors; 
4 - It is always easier to privatize profitable companies. The Juppé Government had planned to sell 
the then unprofitable company Thomson for 1 French Franc in 1996: the Privatization Commission 
refused the decision and it was postponed; 
5 – But at the same time, it is more difficult to explain why well-run entities need to be privatized 
(why change a good system ?). Opponents to the privatization of efficient firms like France 
Telecom first, and later of EDF stress the risks associated with a change in ownership and 
management. On the contrary, privatizing poorly-run entities is more readily acceptable; 
6 - Strong union presence hinders privatization. The major trade union, Confédération Générale du 
Travail (CGT), a former close ally of the French Communist Party (PCF), is opposed to 
privatization in principle. It is very strong in some public companies like the electricity producer 
EdF. In the recent years a new union (SUD) was created from parts of other unions. SUD is 
radically opposed to privatization. It is a minor, but very vocal stakeholder in the railways and 
telecoms.  
7 - Finally, timing plays a great role in privatization. Governments decide on a tentative calendar 
that will be followed  - or not, depending on elections outcome stock exchange levels, economic 
outlook etc. For example, the capital of  Snecma, a major aviation equipment manufacturer, was 
planned to be opened by the Jospin government (before 2002). Finally, the move should be 
completed in 2004 by the Raffarin government. Poor conditions on the Paris Bourse explain the 
delay. 
 
Table 12 about here 
Table 13 about here 
 
At the end of 2003, state-owned firms can be found in 4 major categories: 
1 - Public services. Privatization follows European Union deregulation policies, usually with some 
delay. The case of EdF, the electricity producer is discussed below. SNCF, the national railways 
provides a rather decent service, is in very poor financial condition and trade unions are very active: 
no privatization plans are possible.  
2 - Defense and other strategic industries. Privatization or at least transformation of state 
administrations into standard companies is a must to participate in the construction of the new 
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European defense industry. GIAT-Industries produces weapons and armored vehicles. It is a firm 
since 1990, but its financial problems are such that any further move is impossible. On the contrary, 
DCN (Direction des Constructions Navales, the former Navy shipyards) has been transformed into a 
firm in 2003 and it is in good shape. SNECMA, a major aviation engine producer is on track for 
privatization. 
3 - TV and radio. Back in 1987, the first state channel, TF1, had been privatized and sold to the 
Bouygues group. It is still the market leader with about one third of the total audience and one half 
of the national TV market. France Télévisions is the holding company managing the remaining state 
TV channels, notably France 2 and France 3. Even though rumors regularly surface as to the 
privatization of one or several of these channels, the government had no official plans at the end of 
2003. TF1 had lodged a complaint in 1993 with the European Commission about some state aids to 
the public TV sector, but the Commission, in 2003 has approved the aids. 
4 - Miscellaneous firms: Charbonnages de France (coal mines, closing down), Française des jeux 
(lottery), toll highways etc. 
 
3.1. EdF 
An interesting example of the difficulties of privatization policies for public services is given by the 
situation of EdF at the end of 2003. On one side, European deregulation policy means that 
competition has arrived on the French market. The French government is fighting to slow the move 
at the European level. On top of that, EdF, as an EPIC, benefits from the financial guarantee from 
the state, a clear advantage anytime it has to borrow money. From a fiscal point of view, it also 
benefits from special possibilities. As a result, in 2003 the European Commission believed that EdF 
benefited from an undue competitive advantage and it has declared its intention to ask the operator 
to pay back to the state more than €1 bn (mostly unpaid taxes) and to press for a change of statute. 
On the other side, EdF would like to be in a good shape when competition becomes stronger: 
supply of other energies, reform of the specific pension plan, job cuts. But it is prevented by law 
from expanding outside of the electricity sector and the main trade union, CGT, has blocked a 
change in the specific pension plans of EdF-GdF employees in early 2003. So both the management 
of the firm and the French government plan a change of statute and a slow move to competition, a 
policy that would solve most of the problems of EdF. However, CGT, the major trade union in EdF, 
is totally opposed to any change of statute. They have called for a national debate on energy policy 
to support their views.  
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4. Performance measures  
It is extremely difficult to give clear and objective performance measures for French privatization. 
However, we will study three major areas for performance: prices, productivity/cost structure and 
finance.  
 
4.1.  Prices 
In this section, we will concentrate on prices for public services. In competitive areas, like cars, 
banks etc. prices are market-oriented and price controls are very limited. The situation is very 
different for public services as they have to get their tariffs approved by the relevant ministries: La 
Poste has to beg to increase postage stamps prices; EdF has to do the same for electricity tariffs. An 
interesting situation happens when the firm is partly privatized and operates in a partly competitive 
environment. 
 
If we look at the emblematic case of France Telecom again, we can see its retail prices 
decreasing in general and significant marketing efforts taking place (ART 2003; France Telecom 
2003a). These moves follow a complex tariff “rebalancing” strategy where local call prices and 
subscription fees increase while long distance call price decrease as shown in Table 14. It would be 
very difficult to assume that these results are due to privatization of the national operator. More 
likely, deregulation in the telecom sector and competition from new entrants explain most of the 
changes. Moreover, France Telecom (as all other state companies) has to get its main prices 
approved by the Ministers in charge of Telecommunications and the Economy. From 1997 to 2000, 
a minimum decrease in prices had been imposed by the Ministry of Economy (- 9 % per year in 
1997-1998 and – 4.5 % per year in 1999-2000; these figures apply to a selected basket of basic 
services. The required decrease in much larger than inflation rates). On top of that, France Telecom 
has to submit most of its price changes to ART. The opinion of ART is public, but not binding. For 
example, France Telecom submitted 108 tariff decisions to ART in 2002 for approval, resulting in 
64 favorable and 17 unfavorable recommendations (ART 2003). ART is especially careful about 
predatory pricing by France Telecom, so that it might not approve of too low tariffs. In some well 
publicized instances, France Telecom got the Ministers to approve very low tariffs despite negative 
opinions from ART, but these tariffs decisions were eventually cancelled when the competitors 
complained. Therefore France Telecom is walking on a tightrope: if its prices are too high, it will 
lose market share; if its prices are too low, they will not be approved. Quality of service has not 
changed significantly since privatization and, so far, has not been an issue for regulators. The only 
exception has been customer relations for the whole French mobile sector. 
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Table 14 about here    
 
Regarding the highly sensitive issue of interconnection prices, France Telecom, operator 
with significant market power (SMP), has to publish a Price List (Catalogue d’interconnexion) 
every year since 1997 and to get it approved by ART. The interest of France Telecom is to squeeze 
its competitors between high interconnection prices and low retail prices: therefore every Fall a 
battle starts between ART and the incumbent
7. As table 15 shows, interconnection prices have 
significantly decreased thanks to this annual review system. However, tariffs are only one part of 
the problem, as France Telecom can also use many other tactics to delay or make it more difficult 
for its competitors to obtain interconnection when they want it and how they want it
8.   
 
Table 15 about here 
 
4.2.  Productivity and cost structure 
Privatization introduces changes in cost structures for a number of reasons : 
1 – Starting and stopping activities is easier. International expansion is also easier. In the case of 
France Telecom, a few years after privatization the firm has been completely transformed, with a 
tremendous international expansion;  
2 – There is also more flexibility as regards human resources management in all its components : 
hiring, compensation, promotion
9; 
3 – After privatization, specific tax systems disappear (usually leading to higher taxes). 
 
Table 16 about here 
 
4.2.1.  France Telecom : cost structures 
Comparing selected figures for France Telecom is not easy because of its transformation from a 
national to a global company, and also because of many changes in accounting methods during the 
period studied. However, several facts clearly appear from Table 16 comparing the 1996 and 2002 
situations: 
1 – On the whole, personnel costs have decreased in percentage of sales; however, this is the result 
of many changes as explained in the next paragraph. 
2 – Commercial costs have increased. France Telecom does not always publish details about these 
costs, but they always show (except in 2002) a significant growth linked to the development of the 
mobile and internet sector in a competitive environment. In particular, they have shot up from 5.2 to 
7.3 billion euros between 1999 and 2000. The percentage of administrative costs compared to sales, 
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as far as it can be assessed from the figures provided by France Telecom, has been kept at its pre-
privatization level. 
3 – R&D costs have been drastically cut, as discussed later; 
4 – Income tax is difficult to figure out in such a diversified group. However, France Telecom has 
published detailed figures in 1998 for other taxes, such as local taxes. After the end of its specific 
regime, the 1997 IPO has cost France Telecom more than 300 million euros in additional taxes in 
France (mostly local taxes, excluding income tax) in that year. 
So as a conclusion it is difficult to disentangle the impact of growth, international expansion,  
competition and changes in accounting methods.  But it is clear that deregulation has had a major 
impact on marketing and commercial costs, while privatization has had relatively minors impacts on 
R&D costs and tatxes 
 
Table 17 about here. 
 
4.2.2.  France Telecom : personnel costs and labor productivity 
If we look at the figures of France Telecom in France as shown in Table 17, the number of 
employees has decreased from 160,700 to 141,100 between 1996 and 2002 while the sales per 
employee increased from 138,000 € in 1996 to 194,000 € in 2002. This ratio increased on average 
9.4 % per year, well above inflation levels (about 1.5 % per year over the period), and well above 
changes in output.  
 
Graph 3 about here. 
 
Indeed, as shown in Graph 3, labor productivity has grown a great deal. In 1997, each 
employee of France Telecom had to care for 207 main lines and 10 mobile lines. In 2002, (s)he had 
to care for 241 fixed lines, plus 136 mobile lines and 28 internet customers. 
Many attempts have been made to give a more precise vision of productivity changes, using 
DEA or similar methods. The results obtained depend on the quality of the figures and the methods 
used. Using DEA and statistics provided by OECD, France Telecom appeared to be 85 % 
“efficient” in 1998 compared to the best European telecommunications operators (Pentzaropoulos 
and Giokas, 2002). However, efforts by the authors to replicate and enlarge these results using more 
recent figures have failed due to the absence of consistent data on a national basis in the latest 
Communications Outlook (OECD 2003).  
Privatization is only one cause of this increase in labor productivity, the two main ones 
being the development of new services (like mobiles) and the age structure: in France, France 
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Telecom has rather old employees (the average age was 44.4 years in 2002), mostly civil servants 
hired in the seventies and eighties. Starting in 1996, a very large number of employees have retired, 
with additional incentives provided for early retirement (22,000 early retirees between 1996 and 
2002). Hiring new employees has followed a stop-and-go process.  
Before 1992, most employees belonged to a civil service “rank”, linked to the competitive 
exam they had passed, but with a tenuous link to the job they held. This archaic system was then 
replaced by standard job descriptions and promotion systems (leading to an average 7 % increase in 
wages). Increased competition and technological progress also forced redeployments in the staff 
structure. For example, in 2002, 9500 employees have been retrained and mostly transferred to 
customer relations, information systems and multimedia (France Telecom 2003a, France Telecom 
2003b). Full privatization should make these changes easier to implement, but they are feared by 
trade unions. 
Finally, privatization made it easier to give additional compensation to the top management 
of the firm. As expected in a former state administration, salaries were modest for executives and of 
course, no stock options were available. The three largest subsidiaries of France Telecom, Orange 
(mobile), Equant (data) and Wanadoo (Internet) have set up various stock-options plans 
representing respectively 2.3, 3 and 2 % of the capital of the firms in 2002. Regarding the 
compensation of the Chief Executive Officer, while Michel Bon (a former high civil servant, 
graduated from ENA) got around €0.37 million per year, his successor Thierry Breton (an electrical 
engineer, formerly CEO of Thomson)  obtained €1.25 million in 2002. 
 
4.3.  Innovation 
French public services have long had a reputation for innovation and technical prowess
10. All these 
innovations were possible because tariffs were set by the state and were based on large-scale cross-
subsidies between services, at least during the launch of the new services or production tools. 
European regulation, as it opens public services to competition, prohibits cross-subsidies from 
regulated to unregulated activities as detrimental to competition. Moreover, the state had a long-
term view of technical innovation and financial performance so that pay-back periods could be 
long. In privatized firms, the private shareholders are more impatient about financial rewards, less 
enthusiastic about technical innovation (Munari 2002) and unable to deal with social and political 
controversies (as EdF with nuclear energy, dealing with environmental issues). 
The case of France Telecom, again, provides an interesting insight. France had had major 
successes in the seventies in the development of digital switching but also of videotex
11 (Berne 
1997). A less successful, and very costly venture, was decided in cable television in 1982 (Plan 
Cable). Most of these innovations came from the renowned research center, CNET, (Centre 
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National d’Etudes des Télécommunications), founded in 1944 as a national research institution 
dealing with fundamental research coupled to a traditional operator R&D center. Following the IPO 
of France Telecom, CNET has been renamed France Telecom R&D and completely refocused on 
internal needs, mainly for the development of new services (France Telecom 2003a). Costs figures 
for R&D are provided in Table 16 and show a steep decline as a percentage of sales.  
 
4.4.  Finance 
Financial indicators, like profits, debt ratios and stock prices, provide another set of measures of 
performance.  Again, methodological reasons could flaw the results. As public firms are only 
privatized when they are profitable, one has to be very cautious about financial results.  As shown 
in the annual report on state firms published by the Ministry of finance, (Minefi 2003), the financial 
health of the public sector is poor, but now that the government has privatized nearly all the 
profitable companies, it is mostly stuck with the unprofitable ones. One very positive impact of the 
privatization process for the firms is that it forces the government to make them profitable (debt 
reduction, fresh capital, restructuring). Thomson, Air France, Usinor, Crédit Lyonnais have all gone 
through very difficult times: yet, after some painful years, they have been privatized as soon as they 
were in good shape and since then (at least until 2003) they have developed normally
12. Share 
prices incorporate both general trends on the stock exchange and the situation of each company: 
from Table 18, one can see that the results are quite mixed, sometimes very disappointing when the 
company is in deep trouble like Bull. But investors are normally eager to buy shares of privatized 
groups (Observatoire 2003).   
 
Table 18 about here 
Table 19 about here 
 
4.4.1.  France Telecom 
Again, the case of France Telecom is interesting as shown in Table 16 and Graph 3. After its IPO, 
France Telecom expanded very fast, particularly abroad and in new sectors (mobile, internet, 
television). When it bought Orange from Vodafone in 2000 at a price of €43.2 bn, 80 % were paid 
in cash as issuing new stock would have lowered the share of the state below 50 %, a move 
forbidden by law. France Telecom had to borrow massively for this purchase and those following, 
including the subsequent UMTS
13 auctions. Even though overall operational results were quite 
acceptable at group level, some of these purchases failed to produce financial returns (for example, 
the purchase of MobilCom and its UMTS license in Germany), and servicing the debt was nearly 
impossible. At the same time, issuing new stock was doomed to fail because of the low level of 
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stock prices, due to the economic crisis and the telecom bust. The rescue plan devised in 2002 
called for €15 bn of fresh money (€9 bn being provided by the state through ERAP, as explained 
earlier), debt refinancing of €15 bn and €15 bn of savings. The first of these three measures is being 
investigated in 2003 by the European Commission as a possible infringement of the regulation of 
state aid. 
 
As regards stock prices, the introduction price for France Telecom shares was €24.03 and after one 
trading day it was up to €31.5; the share peaked at €219 on March 2
nd, 2000, then fell to an all-time 
low of €6.94 on September 30
th, 2002. In October 2003 the price was around €21. The IPOs of 
Orange and Wanadoo, the two major subsidiaries of France Telecom have not fared better as shown 
in Table 18. 
 
Graph 4 about here 
 
5. Conclusions  
5.1.  The changing role of ideology 
The privatization process in France has been heavily loaded in terms of ideology, as had been the 
case for nationalization itself. The reluctance to privatization had been especially high due to the 
combination of  three political ideologies.  
-  The Socialist ideology states that “people” or state-ownership are in all cases superior to private 
ownership.  
-  The “Dirigiste” (Colbertiste), Bonapartist, and Gaullist tradition, highlights the superior 
knowledge and vision of the state. 
-  A Christian inspired Social Doctrine advocates public property in the name of the public good 
and social solidarity. 
This combination resulted not only in the above-mentioned nationalization, but in provisions for 
“public ownership” to be written down in the 1946 Constitution, as the Government coalition was 
composed of those three political forces. Until the early 1980s, this combination had remained 
prevalent in terms of popular support. The radical changeover in ideology and reality in the United 
States and the United Kingdom did induce, but with some delay, changes in French political 
doctrines. It combined with the disastrous economic situation which followed the phase of 
nationalizations performed by the “Union of the Left” Coalition (1981-1986) to pave the way for 
the protracted, and not yet finalized privatization process. 
 
     
  
21
5.2.  Perception of privatization policies 
Privatisations are now a widely accepted in principle. However, Unions and social forces are often 
fighting successfully to oppose them as much as they can, in order to preserve special workers and 
social conditions in the public sector. It often takes heralding imperious “strategic” moves, like in 
the Air France KLM merger case, to assuage this reluctance. 
It has to be said that the show of exuberance, and reluctance to comply to the governance 
and information transparency rules they preach, given by the blue ribbon world corporation, has not 
helped in promoting the image of private corporations in the most recent period. 
 
5.3.  Lesson to be learned? 
The implementation of sound governance rules  for the private sector seems to have to go hand in 
hand with the promotion of the privatization process. The succeeding French governments have 
learnt the hard way that privatization is a slow process and that one should pay as much attention to 
corporate governance of partially privatized firms as to privatization moves. As an example, the 
IPO of France Telecom was a resounding success in 1997; the results of the company were 
disastrous in 2001 and 2002, and not only because of the burst of the telecom bubble. Another sad 
example is provided by the computer manufacturer Bull: the state is unable to bring the firm back to 
profit, despite massive injections of public money (much disliked by the European Commission, as 
expected). 
 
5.4.  Reaction to EU directives 
EU directives have played a very important role in the evolution of economic ideologies  and 
realities. In many cases, French governments have taken advantage of them to promote internal 
policies they actually supported without daring saying so. We know no directive can be taken 
without the explicit agreement of member countries Governments. “Brussels constraining 
demands”, however, have often been invoked by French governments as imposing upon them to 
take not-so-popular or unpopular measures and decisions. It is a well established principle that 
European policy is neutral as regards the ownership of firms. However, European policy promotes 
competition in most sectors. These changes have deep impacts on state firms. Actually, they cannot 
survive in the new, deregulated, environment without drastic changes. Probably, privatization is the 
only way for them to meet the challenges of deregulation. After France Telecom and Air France, the 
government has decided the IPO of EdF and GdF. After France Telecom again, EdF will be a test 
bed for the success of privatization process: a vital service, a well-run company, sensitive 
technologies, huge investments in the long-term, deregulation constraints.  
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NOTES 
 
1. In the case of a large, partly state-owned company listed on the stock exchange, any poor 
performance will have two impacts : on stock prices indexes and on financing conditions. 
2.  On Sept. 30, 2002, it was down to €17 bn and on Sept. 9, 2003, it was up to €40 bn. Changes in 
the market value of France Telecom explain most of these enormous changes. See Section 4 for 
details. 
3. Not on a day-to-day basis, but its assets are still massive and any move will have an impact on 
the market. 
4. The Prime Minister has to share part of his power with the President of the Republic, elected in 
separate presidential elections. But for privatization matters, the Prime Minister decides. 
5. Rassemblement pour la République. 
6. Union pour un Mouvement Populaire. 
7 The European Commission has published a directive on the topic, as well as benchmarks. 
8. not all central exchanges are opened to interconnection, for example. 
9. Besides productivity and costs, privatization challenges the traditional management of human 
resources. One should note that a large variety of cases exist amongst state-owned public services. 
Most of these entities used special statutes for their employees and managed them in a very 
bureaucratic way. After privatization, they have followed standard HR policies for private firms. A 
second major change deals with the choice and compensation of CEOs and top managers, again 
following standard business practice. 
10. To name a few examples, EdF has conducted an outstanding program in nuclear energy; rail 
transport has been transformed by the introduction the TGV high speed train by SNCF and Air 
France has, jointly with British Airways, operated the supersonic Concorde plane. 
11. With 7 million Minitel terminals and around 26000 services in 1995 at the peak of the system. 
12. Out of the 1000 largest firms in the world (listed by Business Week by market value in May 
2003), 48 firms were French. There were 23 privatized firms in the list. Amongst them, with their 
world rank: Total (24), France Telecom (57), BNP (74), Vivendi (186), Saint-Gobain (291) Alcatel 
(338), TF1 (617), Thales (756) etc. (Business Week 2003) 
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Note: The CAC40 was initiated on 1/1/88; for earlier dates, a “rebuilt” index 
found at www.bnains.org has been used. 
Source: Minefi, 2003 
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Source : France Telecom Annual Reports 
    5 
  
Graph 4 - France Telecom share price on the Paris Bourse (Euronext) 
 












1997 1999 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004   2 
Table 1 - Public Firms Employment in France 
 Employees 
(thousands) 
% of total wage 
earners 
% of total active 
population 
1947 1152  9.9  5.8 
1960 1108  8.3  5.6 
1970 970  6.0  4.5 
1980 1088  6.0  4.6 
1983 1852  10.3  7.8 
1988 1355  7.2  5.6 
1991 1763  (*)  9.1  7.0 
1994 1505  7.7  6.0 
 
Source: Chabanas and Vergeau (1996), based on figures provided by INSEE 
Note (*) In 1991, La Poste and France Telecom abandoned their administrative 
status and became state enterprises; this move added 430,000 employees to the 
total.  
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Table 2 - Companies controlled by the state 
Year Number  of 
firms controlled





2000 1500  1,1  5.3 
 
Source: INSEE, Répertoire des entreprises contrôlées majoritairement par l’Etat 
Note: Table 1 and Table 2 figures cannot be compared due to changes in statistical 
methodology. 
 
Table 3  - Privatization Framework 
1982   Nationalization law (February 11, 1982): 5 major industrial firms, 41 
banks and finance groups 
1986  Privatization law (July 2, 1986): privatization of all companies 
nationalized after 1982 plus 12 others (mostly insurance, banking) 
1986  Privatization law for TF1 (major public TV channel) 
1989  “Hard core” shareholders dismemberment act 
1993  Privatization act (July 19, 1993): privatization of 13 additional groups 
including Air France, Renault, SEITA, SNECMA, Usinor-Sacilor 
1997 IPO  France  Telecom 
2003  Creation of “Agence des participations de l’Etat” (State agency for public 
firms control) 
Source: adapted from Loiseau (2002) 
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Table 4 - Major IPOs and sales of shares by the state 
Year  Industry  Services  Banking and Insurance 
1986 Saint-Gobain     





 Paribas, Compagnie financière 
de Suez, Société Générale,  
Crédit du Nord, CCF 
1988  Matra     Caisse nationale de crédit 
agricole 
1993 Rhône-Poulenc    BNP 
1994  Elf-Aquitaine    UAP, Société Lyonnaise de 
Banque 
1995 SEITA,  Pechiney, 
Usinor-Sacilor 
  
1996     AGF 
1997 Bull  France  Telecom   
1998 Thomson-CSF  (now 
Thalès) 
 CIC 
1999  Dassault  Air France  Crédit Lyonnais 
2000 Thomson  Multimedia, 
EADS 
  
2002   Autoroutes  du 
Sud de la France 
 
2003 Thomson     
     5 
Dassault Systèmes 
Source Loiseau 2002, Minefi 2003 
 
 
Table 5 – Gross privatization income 1986-2002 – Major phases 
Government  Coalition in power Dates  Income (billion €) 
Chirac Right   1986-1988  13 
Balladur Right  1993-1995  17 
Juppé Right 1995-1997  9.4 
Jospin Left  1997-2002  31 
 
Note: more than €6 bn had been spent in 1983 in the major nationalization plan. 
Source: Mauduit (2002) based on Baert (2000),  Orange & Rocco (1999)  
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Table 6 - France Telecom Timeline 





















European Green Book  
French post and telecom Acts 
European decision: full competition 
in 1998 
 
French telecom acts 
 
ART (regulatory agency) created 
 
Full competition in Europe 
 
 






New European regulatory package 
French telecom act 
French telecom act 
 
FT becomes a para-statal firm 
Alliance with Deutsche Telekom (Atlas) 
Government decision to IPO FT 
CEO: Michel Bon 
Alliance FT-Deutsche  
Telekom-Sprint (Global One) 
FT becomes a private firm at year-end 
Initial Public Offering 
Pensions plans “returned” to the state 
(bn5.7 €) 
2
nd tranche offered (FT) 
IPO, Wanadoo 
Conflict with Deutsche Telekom;  
Global One and Orange purchased 
IPO, Orange 
Severe financial crisis & bail-out;  
CEO: Thierry Breton 
Full privatization of FT possible 
Orange shares buy-out 
Wanadoo shares buy-out 
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Table 7 - Shareholders of France Telecom 
%  Dec. 1997  Jan. 1999 Dec. 2002  Sept. 2003 
State (direct & indirect)  75  63.6  56.5  58.89 
General Public & 
Investors 
22.5 31.2  32.1  34.9 
Owned by France 
Telecom 
- -  8.3  4.29 
Deutsche Telekom  -  2.0  -  - 
Employees 2.5  3.2  3.1  1.92 
 
Source: France Telecom 
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Table 8 - Share of capital owned by foreign investors (2003) 








Vivendi (ex CGE)  Media  1987  67.7  35.4 
Total  Oil and gas  1994  58.0  35.0 
Aventis (ex Rhône-
Poulenc) 
Pharmacy 1993  56.0  35.0 
Alcatel (ex CGE)  Telecom equipment 1987  50  NA 
Saint-Gobain Building  materials  1986  48  31 
BNP Paribas  Bank  1987  45  NA 
Renault Automobile 1996  26  NA 
Thomson Electronics 2000  20 NA 
Thales  
(ex Thomson CSF) 
Defense electronics 1998  15  NA 
France Telecom  Telecommunication
s 
1997 11 3 
TF1  TV  channel 1987 28,1  12,5 
 
Note: France Telecom and TF1 figures for 2002. NA: not available 
Source: Ducourtieux (2003), based on a survey conducted by Georgeson 
Shareholder 
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Table 9 - Private shareholders in privatized companies  
when the shares were sold 
Firm Sector  Shareholders 
(millions) 
Year 
France Telecom  telecommunications  6.7  1997 - 1998 
Paribas bank  3.9  1986 
Elf Aquitaine  oil & gas  3.5  1986-1994 
Rhône-Poulenc  chemicals & drugs  3.0  1993 
BNP bank  2.8  1993 
Air France  airline  2.4   
Société Générale  bank  2.3  1987 
CGE (now 






Source: SBF, Bourse de Paris in: (INSEE 1999 137). 
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Table 10 - Sector Regulation in France – Main bodies 






Finance  2003  Merger of the Commission 
des Opérations de Bourse 












Banque de France  Banking  1800-
1993 







Electricity and gas 
 
2000 
Regulator; the electricity 
transport network (RTE) is 
being separated from EdF, 
the state-owned electricity 
producer 
CSA 
Conseil Supérieur de 
l’Audiovisuel 








Réseau Ferré de 
France 
Railways  1997  Regulator and owner of the 
main railway network; 
carries the network debt 
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Table 11 - Market share of new entrants – Telecommunications in France 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Long distance, fixed  
(% revenue) 
-  -  2.0  19.3 32.8 36.0 35.7 
Local, fixed  
(% revenue) 
- - - - -  3.2  19.1 
Mobiles  (%  users)  42.1 47.0 50.5 51.3 51.8 51.9 50.0 
ADSL  (%  users)  - - - - -  14  29 
Unbundled lines  
(% main lines) 
- - - - -  0.001  0.02 
 
Source: France Telecom Annual Reports; ART and calculations by the authors 
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Table 12 - Major state-owned companies in France (2003) 






Air France  airline  12.7  120  71500 
Areva nuclear  industry 8.3  240  50100 
DCN shipyard  (Navy) 2.2  118  13300 
EdF Electricity  (utility)  48.4  480  172000 
France Télécom telecommunications 46.6  -20700 *  240100 
France 
Télévisions 
Television channels 2.3  53  6200 
GdF natural  gas  14.6 840  37900 
GIAT army  vehicles, 
weapons 
0.8 -118  6200 
La Poste  postal services  17.3  34  325000 
SNECMA aerospace    6.5  106  39000 
SNCF railways  22.2 63  182800 
 
* including –18.2 bn € exceptional items (amortization and provisions) 
Source: company information 
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Table 13 - Privatization status of major state-controlled companies (2003) 
 %  state-
owned 
Status Remarks 
Air France  54  SA, on full 
privatization track 
Government share below 50 % when 
Air France and KLM merge 
Areva 95 
 
SA  Part of the capital is held indirectly by 
state entities (CEA, EdF) 
The public cannot buy shares but 
“investment certificates” 
DCN  100  SA since 2003  Alliances being signed 
EdF 100  EPIC,  on 
privatization track 
Impacted by European deregulation 




59 SA  Full  privatization possible after new 
law is adopted 
France 
Télévisions 
100  SA  No official privatization plans  
GdF 100  EPIC,  on 
privatization track 
Impacted by European deregulation 
La Poste  100  “exploitant public”  Impacted by European deregulation 
SNECMA  97.2  SA, on privatization 
track 
Planned for 2004 
     14 
SNCF  100  EPIC  No privatization plans 
 
Note: The normal legal status for large business firms in France is Société 
Anonyme (SA). SNCF, EdF and GdF are EPIC. The legal form of La Poste is 
unique but it is close to an EPIC. 
Source: company information 
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fixed charge + 
tariff/second 
2000 
fixed charge + 
tariff/second 
2003 









0.113 €  0.157 €  0.157 € 
National call 
(3 minutes) 
1.48 €  1.02 €  0.52 €  0.36 €  0.21 € 
Monthly 
access charge 


















Note (*) : in 1984, the monthly rental includes the supply of a telephone set 
 
     16 
Table 15 - Interconnection prices in France 
€  cent/minute 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Local  0.928 0.707 0.667 0.616 0.579  0.5734 
Simple  transit 1.948 1.537 1.356 1.252 1.051  1.0092 
 
Note : Average price for a basket of interconnection services 
Source: ART 
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Table 16 – Cost structure, France Telecom (selected items) 
 
Million € 


























Net income  321 
9.1 % 
-20736 
- 44.5 % 
 
Source : France Telecom Annual Reports 
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Table 17 – Labor productivity, France Telecom in France 











1996 160700  33200  1560  663  18 
1997 155500  33700  3081  705  106 
1998 155000  34000  5450  754  495 
1999 152300  34056  10051  709  1016 
2000 148900  34114  14311  769  1831 
2001 145300  34151  17823  824  3001 
2002 141100  34066  19216  854  3924 
 
Source : France Telecom Annual Reports, calculations by the authors 
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Table 18 – Return for investors, selected privatized companies 
Company  IPO date  Initial stock price
€ 
Adjusted  stock price, 
31-10-2003, € 
% change 
BNP 1993  18.30  45.6  147 
Renault 1993  25.15  56.9  126 
Usinor-Sacilor 1995  13.11  12.3  -  6 
Bull 1997  5.49  0.80  -84 
Thomson Multimedia 1  1999  10.73  18.10  69 
Thomson Multimedia 2  2000  53.90  18.10  -66 
France Telecom 1  1997  24.03  20.08  -13 
France Telecom 2  1998  51.59  20.8  -60 
Wanadoo 2000  19.00  6.4  -66 
Orange 2001  9.5  9.5  0 
 
Source: Figaro, 2003 
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Table 19 - France Telecom at a glance 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Group turnover 
(bn€) 
22.9 23.4 24.6 27.2 33.7 43.0 46.6 
Profit 
(bn€) 
0.3 2.3 2.3 2.8 3.7 -8.3  -20.7 
Long-term 
debt (bn€) 
16.3 15.4 13.1 14.6 61.0 60.7  68 
Employees 
(Group) 









Fixed -France  
( % of sales) 
88 82 
 
77 70 55 46 40 
Fixed – abroad 
(% of sales) 
1 2 3 9  16  16  20 
Mobiles  
( % of sales) 
7  11 15 17 26 34 36 
Internet / 
(% of sales) 
4 5 
 
5 3 3 4 4 
Source: France Telecom, Annual Reports and calculations by the authors 
Internet sales include videotex and directories revenues 
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